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Those familiar with Wittgenstein‘s later writings know that Wittgenstein believed that description was the 
proper pursuit of philosophy. Despite the fact that description is so clearly fundamental to Wittgenstein‘s 
philosophical thought, little attempt has been made to understand exactly what he was saying about 
descriptions. Where something is said, it is either that Wittgenstein thought that the proper job of philosophy 
was to describe language-games or uses of individual terms. Sometimes an attempt is made to explain what a 
language-game is, or which uses of terms should be described, but usually it is assumed that this is more or less 
self-evident, or that the details do not matter; what is important is that Wittgenstein advocated description over 
explanation. 
 
Although interpretations tend to leave it at this, Wittgenstein himself repeatedly claims that we call many 
different kinds of things descriptions and that there is no one proper case of description. Given that Wittgenstein 
believes that there is such a variety of descriptions, and that he thinks this significant enough to repeat a number 
of times, it seems that something has been left out of the usual account of Wittgenstein on description. This 
paper is an attempt to begin to remedy that. 
 
My purpose is to highlight and distinguish between two related suggestions Wittgenstein made regarding 
description, one general and one more specific. The general suggestion has already been mentioned; it is the job 
of philosophers to describe. This leaves open questions of what we are to describe, and what form or purpose 
these descriptions are to have. The more specific suggestion I want to highlight provides one answer to the first 
of these questions; it is a suggestion about what we are to describe. It is the suggestion that we should describe 
descriptions. In other words, the first, general, suggestion is that descriptions are what philosophers are 
supposed to produce, and the second, more specific, suggestion is that descriptions should be a topic of study 
and description. 
 
The first section of this paper begins with a discussion of Wittgenstein‘s general claim that it is the job of 
philosophers to describe rather than explain. This section goes on to present a number of passages in which he 
asks us to think about what descriptions of various types of things are like: descriptions of attitudes, of faces, of 
paintings, etc. Section II provides an illustration of the kind of project Wittgenstein has in mind when he asks us 
to think about and describe descriptions: in it I discuss what we can learn from descriptions of pain. The third 
and final section examines the sort of mistakes in interpretation that can result from failing to take Wittgen-
stein‘s attitude towards describing descriptions into account. Here I focus on mistakes that have been made in 
interpreting Wittgenstein‘s discussion of rule-following. 
 
I. 
Throughout his writings Wittgenstein is not only concerned with specific philosophical problems, but also with 
the nature of philosophy. His most sustained discussion of the nature and parameters of philosophy is Q8"93 of 
the Big Typescript.
1
 In these and other passages he makes it clear that he believes that philosophical inves-
tigations should be investigations of language. The reason for this is that philosophical perplexities arise 
because of misunderstandings about language. This is not to say that these perplexities are only about language. 
In our attempts to offer philosophical explanations we misapply analogies and confuse ourselves with 
ambiguous terms. The result of this, according to Wittgenstein, is that we make mistakes about the topics of our 
discussions, and not merely about the language in which we discuss them. 
 
Another sustained discussion of the role of philosophy is found in Philosophical Investigations, from 
approximately § 106±§ 13 3.
2
 In these later passages Wittgenstein repeatedly expresses the idea that it is not the 
job of philosophy to explain, but merely to describe. Here is a sampling of what he says: 
 
We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its 
purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the 
workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand 
them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. (§ 109) 
 
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. (§ 124)3 
 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view there is 
nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. (§  126) 
 
When Wittgenstein talks of description in these passages, he is talking about descriptions of language. This is 
made explicit in § 109 and § 124, and given the context there is no doubt that he is talking about language in the 
remainder of the passages between § 106 and §133. But beyond this there is little in these passages to indicate 
exactly which aspects of language are to be described. Nor are there passages elsewhere in which Wittgenstein 
provides a clear explanation of which aspects of language he has in mind. But this does not mean that there is 
no way to figure out what he thinks philosophers should describe. We can look at what he himself does, and at 
the specific questions he asks throughout his writings. I will say more about this below. 
 
Unfortunately, the fact that Wittgenstein gives no explicit formulation of his intentions concerning description 
makes it easy to dismiss his proposal without having a detailed understanding of what that proposal is. For 
instance, in the preface of The Logical Basis of Metaphysics Michael Dummett rejects the suggestion that 
philosophy should be limited to description, although he does not pretend to say anything about the sorts of 
descriptions Wittgenstein was concerned with: 
 
We all stand ... in the shadow of Wittgenstein ... Some things in his philosophy, however, I cannot see any 
reason for accepting: and one is the belief that philosophy, as such, must never criticise but only describe.... I 





In volume two of The False Prison David Pears is similarly insensitive to worries about various types of 
description, when he considers what Wittgenstein means by the claim that philosophy should describe, not 
explain.
5
 Pears begins his discussion by asking what kind of explanation Wittgenstein is rejecting, and goes on 
to ask why Wittgenstein is interested in description. But he says nothing at all about what Wittgenstein means 
by ―description‖. This is treated as self-evident. 
 
When some kind of claim is made as to the type of descriptions Wittgenstein had in mind, it is often assumed 
that he was interested in descriptions of the uses of individual terms.6 For instance, summarizing x 125, P. M. 
S. Hacker says: 
 
If one discovers through questioning that someone is using different and conflicting rules for one and the same word, then one brings 
him to see a source of confusion, and the necessity for a decision. But the decision should be his, not the therapist‘s.
7
 (my emphasis) 
 
In the section Hacker is interpreting Wittgenstein talks about the rules we use in games and mathematics, and it 
is clear that he is talking about the rules of language as well. However Wittgenstein does not mention words at 
all. Nevertheless, Hacker, like many others, assumes that Wittgenstein is saying that the solutions to our 
philosophical problems lie in describing rules for the use of individual terms. My point is not that Wittgenstein 
never talks about the uses of individual terms. In  § 43 he says, ―For a large class of cases-though not for all-in 
which we employ the word ‗meaning‘ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.‖
8
 
My point is merely that the fact that he sometimes talks about describing uses of individual terms has led some 
to talk as if this is what Wittgenstein has in mind whenever he talks of description. 
 
Expanding on the idea of describing the uses of individual terms, some have also mentioned describing the uses 
of sentences. In both cases the sort of use to be described is often left unspecified; certainly Wittgenstein gives 
no clear account of the aspects of the use of a word or sentence he believes should be described. Sometimes it is 
said that what is to be described is their use in a language-game. And sometimes it is said that we should 
describe language-games themselves. 
 
Wittgenstein does make all of these suggestions at one time or another, but these are not the descriptions he 
talks about most often. More often he talks about descriptions of various phenomena and other sorts of things, 
and he is interested in describing these descriptions. Of course I cannot prove that he talks about one type of 
description more than another without quoting all of the relevant passages, so in the end readers will have to 
return to the texts to check this out for themselves. In the meantime, here is a sampling of passages, from the 
Investigations and elsewhere, in which Wittgenstein discusses various descriptions; these are descriptions of 
phenomena, not descriptions of the use of individual terms, sentences, or language-games. Notice the difference 
between the types of points he is making here as opposed to the point he was making in the collection of 
passages quoted earlier: 
 
Think how many different kinds of thing are called ‗description‘: description of a body‘s position by means of its co-ordinates; 
description of a facial expression; description of a sensation of touch; of a mood. (§ 24) 
 
What we call ‗descriptions‘ are instruments for particular uses.... Thinking of a description as a word-picture of the facts has 
something misleading about it: one tends to think only of such pictures as hang on our walls: which seem simply to portray how a 
thing looks, what it is like. (§291) 
 
And now look at all that can be meant by ―description of what is seen‖. – But this just is what is called description of what is seen. 
There is not one genuine propercase of such description– the rest being just vague, something which awaits clarification, or which 
must just be swept aside as rubbish. (p. 200) 
 
The question ―What do you see?‖ gets for answer a variety of kinds of description. – If now someone says ―After all, I see the aspect, 
the organization, just as much as I see shapes and colours‖ – what is that supposed to mean? That one includes all that in ‗seeing‘? Or 




It is possible to describe a painting by describing events; indeed that‘s the way it would be described in almost every instance. ―He‘s 
standing there, lost in sorrow, she‘s wringing her hands ... ‖ Indeed, if you could not describe it this way you wouldn‘t understand it, 
even if you could describe the distribution of color on its surface in minute detail. 
10 
 
What is the description of an ‗attitude‘ like?11 
 
None of the descriptions mentioned in these passages are descriptions of the uses of individual terms. In fact, 
none of these descriptions are descriptions of language at all. They are descriptions of faces, paintings, and 
things we see, etc. How can Wittgenstein insist that it is the job of philosophy to focus its attention on language, 
while he writes about descriptions of so many different things? The answer to this question is that all 
descriptions are in language, and therefore to talk about descriptions, whether or not they are descriptions of 
language, is to talk about language. And to describe descriptions is to describe language, no matter what those 
described descriptions describe. 
 
The descriptions Wittgenstein mentions here are not philosophical descriptions – at least insofar as the 
descriptions philosophers offer are in any way distinct.
12
 The descriptions he talks about are everyday 
descriptions: How do we describe paintings, attitudes, or what we see? In none of these passages is Wittgenstein 
advocating either that philosophers describe the uses of particular terms, or that we engage in describing the 
things to which those terms refer. Rather, he is saying that philosophers should describe the descriptions that 
people give of the things they talk about. 
 
The following illustrates the difference between descriptions of things and descriptions of descriptions of 
things: A description of a particular painting might begin, ―A young woman is sitting under a tree ... ‖. In 
contrast, a description of descriptions of paintings might begin, ―In a representational painting the event 
depicted in the painting is described ... ‖. And it is the description of the descriptions of paintings that 
Wittgenstein asks about. Similarly, in the quotation from Philosophical Investigations §24 he does not ask us to 
describe facial expressions, sensations, or moods, or the use of terms for facial expressions, sensations, or 
moods. He asks us to compare descriptions of facial expressions, sensations, and moods. And in Zettel §204 he 
does not ask for a description of an attitude, nor does he ask how ―attitude‖ is used. He asks what a description 
of an attitude is like. In all of these passages the topics are the descriptions themselves. 
 
Thus, Wittgenstein made two distinct, albeit related, suggestions concerning descriptions. The first and more 
general of these is that it is the job of philosophers to engage in description of language, and to refrain from 
explanation. As we have seen, this leaves it open which aspects of language are to be described, and what form 
those descriptions are to take. The second, and more specific suggestion is illustrated by the passages quoted 
above; philosophers should investigate descriptions. Taken together, the suggestion is that philosophers should 
describe descriptions. In the next section I will follow Wittgenstein‘s advice and see what we can learn from 
describing descriptions of pain. 
 
II. 
Describe a pain you remember, or one you are currently experiencing. In doing this you will probably say 
something about how severe it is, and where it is located. You might also say something about how it actually 
affects your behavior (it makes me wince, or limp, or keeps me from concentrating), or what it makes you feel 
like doing (it makes me feel like crying, or shrieking). You are likely to describe it in terms of the sorts of things 
you believe would cause similar feelings (stabbing, burning, it feels as if someone is pounding on my head with 
a hammer). And no doubt there are many other things you might say as well. What would you learn about pain 
by offering this description? It does not seem that in describing this individual pain you would be making any 
philosophical observations. 
 
But if we look at your description and take it, along with other descriptions of other pains, as the things to be 
studied, perhaps we can learn a little more. In doing this we might begin by saying much of what was indicated 
in the previous paragraph. Descriptions of pains often attribute to them location and relative severity. From 
looking at these aspects of pain descriptions we learn that pains are located and come in varying degrees of 
severity. 
13
 We also learn that a pain‘s location is determined by where it is experienced. This is perhaps most 
clearly demonstrated by descriptions of what is called ―referred pain,‖ as well as by descriptions of phantom 
pain. A person who has had her leg amputated can legitimately describe a pain as being where her leg should 
be. The fact that her leg is no longer there gives us no reason to reject her description. The pain is appropriately 
described as being where it is experienced, and not at the physical location of the damage or nerve stimulation 
that explains its occurrence. That is, the answer to the question ―Where does it hurt?‖ is almost always 
immediately obvious to the person in pain, even if the location of the cause of that pain is not, and we treat his 
sincere description of where that pain is as authoritative. 
 
Looking at pain descriptions we also discover that most often one classifies pains according to the type of cause 
one would expect to produce a pain like the one one is feeling.
14
 Thus, a burning pain is a pain that feels like the 
pain that is commonly caused by burning, a sharp pain is like the pain that is often caused by something sharp, 
etc. (There is at least one exception to this. To describe a pain as an ache plays the same kind of role as 
describing it as sharp or burning, but it does not involve indicating a typical external cause of a kind of pain.) 
This is not to say that a particular pain will be categorized on the basis of its actual cause. There is a difference 
between categorizing pains on the basis of actual causes, and categorizing them on the basis of what they feel 
like. We normally do the latter, not the former; ice can cause a burning pain. 
 
There are other things we can learn about pain by paying attention to how we describe it, as well. For instance, 
we can learn something about the privacy of pain. One might believe that it is merely a contingent fact that we 
do not feel one anothers‘ pains.
15
 And there is a related fact about our relation to one anothers‘ pains which is 
contingent; the fact that, in the actual world, the physical pain of one person does not cause physical pain in 
another. But we must be careful not to confuse this fact with the fact that pain is private. It is possible to 
imagine a world in which a person can experience physical pain as the result of touching a painful spot on 
another person‘s skin. But that would not be a world in which pain is public. 
 
To see this, think about how we would deal with descriptions of pain if we suddenly found that painful 
experiences resulted from touching other people‘s wounds. Consider what our reaction would be if Henry‘s 
sincere description of the pain he comes to know about by touching Helen‘s sunburnt skin differs significantly 
from Helen‘s sincere description of the pain she is experiencing. She says it is mild, he says it is terrible; she 
says that it is burning, he says that it is sharp; etc. Would we wonder which of them was mistaken? Would we 
automatically favor one description over another? (On the one hand, maybe we should favor Helen‘s 
description. After all, it is her pain. On the other hand, perhaps Henry‘s external position is the better one from 
which to get an objective view of the pain.) We would accept both descriptions. But if each description is 
correct, and they are not compatible, then – in our normal way of speaking – they do not describe the same 
thing. What Helen describes is Helen‘s, and what Henry describes is Henry‘s. That this is the way we would 
deal with these descriptions shows that we regard pain as essentially private. 
 
But how do I know how people would think about what we now call ―pain‖ in such a counterfactual situation? 
Can‘t we stipulate a world the inhabitants of which do not accept conflicting descriptions such as those offered 
by Henry and Helen? We certainly can stipulate this, and in that case these people would be talking about 
something public; but they would not be talking about what we call ―pain‖. They would not have our concept of 
pain, or be using our term ―pain‖. Notice that the only change that we are imagining between this newest 
situation and the one described in the previous paragraph is a difference in which descriptions are accepted. In 
the first paragraph conflicting descriptions are not accepted, in this case they are. That is a grammatical 
difference. It is not a change in the way the world is outside of language. 
 
Wittgenstein considers a situation similar to the last one described: 
 
... it would be conceivable that a connection could be established with someone else through which I would feel the same pain (i.e. the 
same kind of ‗pain‘), and in the same place, as the other person. But that this is the case would have to be ascertained through both 
people‘s expression of pain. 
 
And if this way of getting to know someone else‘s pain were to have proved its worth, it‘s conceivable that one would apply it against 
a person‘s expression of pain, and thus would mistrust his expression if it contradicted that test. 
 
And now one can also imagine that there are people who follow that method from the outset, and call that ―pain‖ which is ascertained 
by means of it. In that case their concept ‗pain‘ will be related to ours, but different from it. 
16 
 
In other words, Wittgenstein is saying that it is conceivable that beings in other ways like us could have painful 
knowledge of one anothers‘ ‗pains‘. Moreover, it is conceivable that they find this knowledge so reliable – the 
wounded person and those who touch his wound almost always agree in their descriptions of the ‗pain‘, other 
persons‘ descriptions give as good or better indication of the seriousness of the damage causing the ‗pain‘, etc. – 
that they are as likely to accept the ―observer‘s‖ description of a ‗pain‘ as they are to accept the description 




On the way of speaking Wittgenstein imagines the persons he describes say that they feel one anothers‘ ‗pains‘. 
But on our way of speaking we would say that the world Wittgenstein describes is a world in which one 
person‘s physical pain can cause physical pain in another. What is important to see is that there are no facts that 
will make either way of speaking right and the other wrong. This is not an empirical question. Even if I am 
mistaken about what we would say if we suddenly found that it hurt to touch another‘s wound, the previous 
paragraphs illustrate that the same empirical facts can support both a person‘s description of the pain she has as 
a result of touching someone else‘s sunburn, as well as her description of the ‗pain‘ of his sunburn. This is not 
to say that empirical facts are irrelevant; neither description is ever true in our world. It is just to say that the 
very same facts will support both ways of speaking. 
 
Another way to see that these people would not be talking about pain in the same way we do is to see that they 
would disagree with us, in other cases, about what sorts of descriptions of pains are acceptable. Obviously, the 
new public concept we have been talking about is closely related to our concept of pain, but this concept is also 
more like our concept of warmth than is our actual concept of pain. I can offer a description of how warm I am, 
and I can also describe the warmth of others‘ bodies. But I cannot give a firsthand description of pain in other 
persons‘ bodies. In contrast, the people we have been imagining describe their own ‗pain‘, and can describe the 
‗pain‘ of others. To this extent, therefore, their concept of ‗pain‘ is similar to our concept of warmth. But if this 
is right then what is to keep them from being in a position to describe the ‗pain‘ of non-sentient objects just as 
we describe their warmth? Ironically, this point is brought out by Harold Langsam, during the course of an 
argument by means of which he intends to prove that what is referred to by ―pain‖ in our present language is 
only contingently private: 
 
The similarities between the imagined cases of touching smooth and warm objects exposes the arbitrariness of the Wittgensteinian 
denial that in the imagined cases I feel my lover‘s pain. For there is no more reason to deny that in the imagined situations I can feel 
my lover‘s pain than there is to deny that in normal situations I can feel the smoothness and warmth of my lover‘s skin. 
18 
 
But if there really is no more reason to deny that one might feel another‘s pain than there is to deny that one can 
feel the smoothness and warmth of her skin, then neither is there any reason to deny that one can feel the pain of 
inanimate objects. After all, feeling the smoothness and warmth of another person‘s skin is no different than 
feeling the smoothness and warmth of an inanimate object. But, of course, we will not accept as legitimate 
descriptions of an inanimate object‘s pain. No matter what I feel when I touch a flame, it is inappropriate for me 
to describe the pain as belonging to the flame. 
 
What Langsam has failed to recognize is that there is a fundamental difference between our concept of pain and 
our concept of warmth. There are two distinct senses in which a person can feel warmth; an objective sense and 
a subjective sense. But ―pain‖ only has a subjective sense. In the objective sense of ―warm,‖ different persons 
can feel that the same thing is warm. Both you and I can offer first-hand descriptions the warmth of my coffee. 
We might even disagree about whether it is very warm or only tepid, and we might settle our dispute by asking 
others or by measuring the coffee‘s temperature with a thermometer. In our language there is no use of ―pain‖ 
that parallels this objective sense of ―warm‖. 
 
But ―warm‖ can also have another sense. A person can experience warmth even though she is not touching 
anything that is warm. This is the subjective sense, and, as with pain, every person is an authority on whether or 
not they themselves are experiencing warmth in the subjective sense. Although I can use a thermometer to show 
that you are mistaken in believing that my coffee is very warm, rather than merely tepid, this has no bearing on 
the character of your subjective experience. The coffee might feel very warm to you because you were just 
outside, barehanded, shoveling snow. This is the sort of thing that can affect one‘s subjective experience of 
warmth, but the warmth of the coffee is not affected by the fact that you have just come in out of the cold. You 
are the primary authority in regards to your subjective experience of warmth, in just the same way that you are 
the primary authority on whether or not you feel pain, and Langsam can no more feel the warmth of his lover‘s 
skin in the subjective sense than he can feel her pain. 
 
We can now sum up the suggestion that there could be a world in which pain was public as the suggestion that 
there could be a world in which ―pain‖ had an objective, as well as a subjective sense. This is true, but because 
in our world ―pain‖ has no objective sense, that would be a world in which ―pain‖ has a sense that it does not 
have here. 
The factors we have considered in this section illuminate our concept of pain. If we were creating a computer 
program to deal with descriptions of pain we would want it to search those descriptions for indications of a 
pain‘s location, severity and type. We would not want it to look for indications of a pain‘s color, sound, or 
weight. We would also want it to take into account who is offering the description: Is it the person in pain, or 
someone observing him? Thus, by considering specific acceptable (not necessarily true) descriptions of 
particular pains we discover the parameters of what can sensibly be said about pain. We might say that this 
gives us an account of the pain language- game. Or we might say that it tells us about the general nature of pain. 
 
Unfortunately, although not false, both of these options can be misleading. The first option, that we have 
learned something about the pain language-game, is misleading because it sounds as if only language is at issue, 
as if it doesn‘t matter what we say, so long as consistent relations between terms are maintained. Recall, 
however, that Wittgenstein talks of more than language as having a role in a language-game, and he clearly 




But the second option is also misleading. It is misleading because it encourages one to think that pains exist in 
the same way that stones or brains do. For instance, it encourages us to think of the location of a pain as 
analogous to the location of a stone; as if we might be able to put a stone in the place where the pain is, as if it 
could take up the same space. But there are important differences between the acceptable descriptions of a 
stone‘s location and acceptable descriptions of the location of a pain. For instance, the location of a stone may 
be other than it appears to be, while this is not true for the location of a pain (though it may be true for the 
location of its cause). It is also natural to describe a pain as having come back, even though it wasn‘t anywhere 
else in the meantime, but a stone certainly cannot come back unless there is somewhere it was while it was 
away. Perhaps when we say that a pain has returned we only mean that it is a pain of the same type, but to insist 
on this because that is what we would have to say if a physical object disappeared and an indistinguishable one 
took its place is to beg the question. At least on the face of it, it is one thing to say that this headache is like the 
one I had last month (of the same type), and another to say that the very same headache returned when the 
medication wore off. 
 
All of this makes saying whether or not the term ―pain‖ refers to some thing which is pain quite tricky. The 
phenomena on the basis of which the truth of our descriptions of pain depend are the same as the phenomena on 
the basis of which the truth of very different descriptions might depend, as evidenced by our discussion of the 
people who said they felt one another‘s pains. Even though our descriptions depend on precisely the same 
phenomena, what those people described were public phenomena, while what we describe are essentially 
private. This makes it awfully tempting to do as Wittgenstein does, and reject the idea that ―pain‖ is a referring 
term, or that pains are objects. 
 
– ―And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing.‖ – Not at all. It is not a something but not a 
nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We 
have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here. (§304) 
 
Language does not determine how the world is. Something bad would happen if I dropped a brick on my foot, 
regardless of how it might be described. What sorts of descriptions of the world are appropriate will depend, in 
part, on the grammar of our language and in part on how the world is. And given the way the world is, some 
ways of organizing language will be more useful than others; but this does not mean that there is one best way, 
one best grammar. Wittgenstein‘s concern is that we get a clear view of the grammar that we actually use, even 
if there are others we might have used instead. 
 
III. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that the failure to appreciate, or perhaps the decision to ignore, the centrality 
of description for Wittgenstein has influenced discussions on other aspects of his work. For instance, many 
discussions of the passages on rule following take it for granted that Wittgenstein sought to explain how rules 
work, or what it is that grounds our use of them, etc. It is assumed that Wittgenstein had hoped to find some 
fact-of-the-matter present when a person decides to follow a rule and which unambiguously determines which 
future actions are or are not in accord with that rule. But if Wittgenstein took his own advice, he should have 
been talking about descriptions of rules and rule-following rather than about explanations of how rules 
determine actions, or of what determines whether or not an action is in accord with a given rule. 
 
Kripke‘s discussion in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is an excellent example of a mistaken 
attempt to see Wittgenstein as looking for an explanation of the way rules determine future actions. Kripke 
begins the first chapter of his book with a selection from the first paragraph of Investigations §201: ―This was 
our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out 
to accord with the rule .‖
20
 Throughout the rest of his book Kripke writes as if this passage summarizes 
Wittgenstein‘s view about a genuine difficulty about rule-following. But if we look at the second paragraph of 




It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we 
give one interpretation after another; as if each contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet 
another standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation, but which is exhibited by what we call ―obeying the rule‖ and ―going against it‖ in actual cases. 
 
This paragraph speaks of the previous one, the one quoted by Kripke, as exhibiting a misunderstanding: it is a 
misunderstanding to think that no course of action can be determined by a rule simply because every course of 
action can be seen as being in accord with that rule. Wittgenstein‘s implicit suggestion in the second paragraph 
is that our worries about rule-following would be quieted if we attended to descriptions of the situations in 
which a person is said to be obeying a rule or going against it. Although it is true that we can describe any 
action as being in accord with a give rule, in actual practice there is clearly no need to worry about this. Thus, 
what we should do is look at our actual practice; what sorts of descriptions do we give of a person who is 
obeying a rule and what sorts of descriptions do we give of one who is going against it? In order to give a full 
description of rule-following it is not enough to describe a narrowly defined action and a corresponding rule. 
We need to describe the situations in enough detail to allow us to appreciate all of the relevant factors and the 
roles they play. That is, our descriptions must take into account the context in which this practice of following a 
rule occurs. 
 
It is true that the paragraph from which Kripke quotes seems to assume that we need only look at rules and 
narrowly defined actions in order to know whether or not the actions are determined by the rules. But in this 
paragraph Wittgenstein is summing up the difficulty that arises from looking at the problem in the wrong way, 
he is not expressing what he takes to be the correct conclusion about rule- following. Mistaking Wittgenstein‘s 
summary of a mistaken view as an account of the view he holds leads Kripke to conclude, in chapter three, that 
― ... Wittgenstein holds, with the skeptic, that there is no fact as to whether I mean plus or quus.‖
22 
 
Again, Kripke‘s claim is mistaken. Although Wittgenstein might have said that there is no fact that determines 
whether I meant plus or quus, he would not have said that there was no fact as to what I meant. This is because 
in real life we accept that descriptions of rule-following can legitimately include statements about whether or 
not an action is in accord with the rule as it was meant. If I ask you to show the children a game, and you teach 
them gaming with dice, my claim that ―I didn‘t mean that sort of game‖ can be true.
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 This is so even though if 
you ask me in virtue of what it is true, I have no (there is no) knock-down answer. Nevertheless, if you are 
reluctant to believe me when I say that that was not what I meant, I can appeal to my membership in the Down 
with Gambling Club and my well-known thoughts on the impressionability of young children. That is, these are 
the sorts of facts that you are supposed to take to be relevant, even though my membership in the Down with 
Gambling Club and my thoughts on the impressionability of young children do not determine what I can mean 
when I say, ―Show the children a game.‖ 
 
When we recognize the role that practice plays in rule-following and in the proper attribution of rule-following 
we see that specific facts about the origin of an action cannot determine whether or not that action is in accord 
with a particular rule. The apparent paradox mentioned in §201 arises only apart from any practice and outside 
of any context. But practice and context are essential to the question of whether or not a rule is being followed. 
This is why there can be no private rule-following and no private language.
24 
Thus, in the following section, 
§202, Wittgenstein says: ―And hence also ‗obeying a rule‘ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not 
to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‗privately‘: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule 
would be the same thing as obeying it.‖ 
 
A detailed description of descriptions of rule-following behavior, of the actual situations in which we say that 
someone is ―obeying a rule,‖ would not only illustrate the importance of context and practice, it would also 
demonstrate that these descriptions involve many recurring themes. For instance, as also indicated above, when 
a person describes himself or someone else as obeying a rule he generally does not owe any further account of 
that behavior. We would also find that a person is very often said to be following a rule if her answer matches 
the answers many others give. (This is not to say that giving the same answer as others is what constitutes 
following a rule, it is only to say that in such situations one will be described as obeying the rule; further 
considerations could prompt an alteration of that description.) Descriptions in which one is said to be following 
a rule will also often include a claim to the effect that the person is continuing to do the same thing, or that he is 
doing the same thing that others did when they followed the rule. Etc. 
 
On Wittgenstein‘s view the problem arises when those such as Kripke try to offer an explanation of rule-
following from outside of a rule-following language-game, rather than describing the practices involved in it. 
As a result of their perspective they ignore our actual descriptions of rule-following or reject some of these 
types of descriptions because they appear to conflict with others. In contrast, for Wittgenstein the challenge is to 
see all of these types of description as consistent. These just are the descriptions we give of following a rule. His 
insistence on maintaining all of our useful types of description leads Wittgenstein to deny that the truth of a 
description of rule-following is determined in anything like the way that the truth of a description of a physical 
object is determined. Throughout the Investigations Wittgenstein repeatedly demonstrates that he accepts 
descriptions of rules without accepting that these descriptions work in the same way when applied to rules as 
seemingly identical descriptions work when applied to other things. 
 
In passages around §201 Wittgenstein frequently introduces phrases one might use to describe what happens 
when one follows a rule. In each case his intention is to demonstrate how one might try to assimilate following 
a rule to other activities on the basis of apparent similarities between descriptions of rule-following and 
descriptions of other activities. ―But,‖ as Wittgenstein says earlier in the Investigations, ―assimilating the 
descriptions of uses of words in this way cannot make the uses themselves any more like one another. (§ 10) 
More generally, Wittgenstein warns against assuming that two things are similar just because their descriptions 
are similar; the similarity between a photograph and the scene it depicts is not nearly as great as the similarity 
between the description of that photograph and the description of the scene. In much the same way describing 
both pain and warmth as things that we feel disguises important dissimilarities. Etc. Let us look at some other 
passages in which Wittgenstein tries to warn us against being mislead by the way we describe our experiences 
with rules. 
 
Philosophical Investigations § 197 begins, ―‗It‘s as if we could grasp the whole use of a word in a flash.‘ – And 
that is just what we say we do. That is to say: we sometimes describe what we do in these words.‖ The section 
continues with a discussion about how this way of describing what happens when we come to understand the 
use of a term can be misleading; this is not to say that it is false. It is misleading because using the same words 
to describe coming-tounderstand as one uses to describe events which occur very quickly leads one to try to find 
similarities between understanding ―in a flash‖ and events such as finishing one‘s dinner ―in a flash,‖ or even 
the event of a flash of light. It leads us to believe that everything that is relevant to whether or not a person has 
understood can occur in a moment; ―... we are led to think that the future development must in some way 
already be present in the act of grasping the use ....(§ 197) 
 
But if our primary reason for believing that coming-to-understand is an event that occurs in a brief and definite 
time is that we can describe it using the same words that we use to describe events that occur at a definite 
moment, then the way to see that it is not really an event of this type is to see that other ways of describing these 
events are not legitimate as descriptions of coming-to-understand. For instance, typically other events that can 
be described as happening in a flash nevertheless have a beginning, middle and end, while coming-to-
understand in a flash does not. These other events can be interrupted, but coming-to-understand in a flash 
cannot. Etc.
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 Thus, we need to be wary of assuming a similarity between comingto-understand in a flash and 
events that occur in a flash. The mere fact that what appears to be one description applies to each does not  
guarantee that they are similar. Nevertheless, we know what someone means when he says that he came to 
understand something in a flash, we understand the difference between this and a slow dawning of 
understanding. Therefore, it is sometimes correct to say that someone understood in a flash, even if to say so 
can be misleading.  
 
A similar discussion takes place in § 219, where Wittgenstein says, 
 
―All the steps are really already taken‖ means: I no longer have any choice.... my  
description only made sense if it was to be understood symbolically. – I should have said: This is how it strikes me. 
 
When I obey a rule, I do not choose. 
 
Here following a rule is being described in the same way as a certain sort of situation, a situation in which the 
steps I am to take, the places I am to put my feet, are marked out in front of me. Other related descriptions of 
such situations and of following a rule are similar as well. In both cases it is natural to describe what I am doing 
by saying that once I have begun, it takes no new decision to continue; although, in both cases, it is also 
possible to describe what I am doing as requiring a new decision at each step.
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 But, again, this similarity 
between some descriptions of following a rule and some descriptions of following along pre-marked footsteps 
can be misleading; these similarities between descriptions foster a temptation to assume additional similarities 
between the things described. If I am walking along a path and describe the situation as one in which ―all the 
steps are really already taken,‖ I am describing a situation in which each particular step has literally been 
marked out before I arrived. Because the experience of following a rule can also be described as finding that 
―all the steps are really already taken‖ it is tempting to assume that in this case as well each step has been 
determined ahead of time in more or less the same way that the steps I should walk along were determined on 
the pre-marked path. But we should not assume this merely on the basis of the similarity of the earlier 
descriptions. An investigation of the phenomena demonstrate important differences; the mere fact that no 
physical marks have been made ahead of time, for instance. And we know that the physical steps could have 
been placed elsewhere, but nothing like this is true with the steps dictated by a rule. Etc. 
 
Or, again, in §222: ―‗The line intimates to me the way I am to go.‘ – But that is of course only a picture. And if 
I judged that it intimated this or that as it were irresponsibly, I should not say that I was obeying it like a rule.‖ 
If a person intimates to me which way I am to go, I may describe myself as following him even though he 
continually tells me to do different things, or leads me ―irresponsibly.‖ But it makes no sense to describe myself 
as following a rule that guides me ―irresponsibly.‖ This is not a permissible or legitimate description of what I 
might be doing. A person can tell me to do what I consider to be different things, but insofar as I take myself to 
be following a rule I take myself to be continuing to do the same thing. For reasons such as these, to describe a 
rule as telling me what to do is to offer a description that is importantly different from a description of a person 
as telling me what to do. Nevertheless, there is a similarity between descriptions of following a rule and 
descriptions of being guided by a person. In both cases, I can also describe what I am doing by saying that I 
decided that I would follow, and that once I made that decision I took the rule, or the person, as the last 
arbitrator of what I was to do next. 
 
Each of the passages discussed in this section began with a brief statement by means of which one might 
describe what it is like to follow a rule, and in each of these passages Wittgenstein went on to demonstrate why 
such descriptions could be misleading. Notice that he never said that these descriptions were incorrect; he 
criticized those who would draw mistaken conclusions from them, but he did not on that account criticize those 
who used the descriptions. 
 
At the beginning of this paper we saw Dummett complain that because of Wittgenstein‘s claimed focus on 
description, Wittgenstein rejected the possibility of criticism. We can now see how Wittgenstein would have 
answered Dummett. He would have acknowledged that he wants philosophers to leave language as they find it; 
if a particular description is commonly used, and a useful distinction is made by means of that description, then 
that description is in order. If Sally says she understood the first poem in a flash, but her understanding of the 
second dawned slowly, I know what she means, and there is no reason to say that she is mistaken in believing 
that she has given accurate descriptions. 
 
But these descriptions also tempt philosophers to assume that there must be a similarity between coming-to-
understand in a flash and events such as lightening strikes. That is, there is a temptation to assume that wherever 
a description applies, it applies in more or less the same way, and therefore that if two things are correctly 
described by the same description this is because they are relevantly similar. Wittgenstein does criticize falling 
prey to thus assumption. But this sort of criticism is consistent with his claim that philosophy‘s job is 
description. It is not a criticism of the ordinary truths described by ordinary persons, it is a criticism of the 
claims philosophers make about what justifies or explains the legitimacy of descriptions. Wittgenstein rejects 
their assumption that similar descriptions must be justified by similarities between the things described; he 
rejects the idea that similarities between descriptions need any justification at all. 
 
IV 
Thus, Wittgenstein‘s ‗exclusive‘ focus on description does allow him to offer some criticisms. In this and other 
ways his claim that philosophy must do away with explanation and restrict itself to description is more complex 
than it has appeared to many. My project has been to examine one aspect of Wittgenstein‘s concern with 
descriptions that has been overlooked; his interest in what descriptions are like, and what we can learn from 
describing descriptions. There are many related questions left to examine: Do philosophical descriptions play a 
special role? Is there only one type of philosophical description? What is a description of an attitude like? Etc. 
Careful attention to what Wittgenstein is doing with descriptions will help us to avoid erroneous interpretations 
of his work, and perhaps we will even find that there is something philosophically valuable to be gained by 
describing our descriptions. 
 
NOTES 
1 Wittgenstein (1989). 
2 Wittgenstein (1958). Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from this text. 
3
 This passage is also in 3 
Wittgenstein (1989), §89. 
4 See Dummett (1991)p. xi. It is interesting that we find the following quote less than twenty pages later: 
 
... we need to scrutinise our own linguistic practices with close attention, in order, in the first instance, to 
become conscious of exactly what they are, but with the eventual aim of attaining a systematic description of 
them.... Will [such a description] also settle the metaphysical controversies themselves? It is my contention that 
it will.... It will resolve these controversies without residue: there will be no further, properly metaphysical, 
question to be determined. 
 
One could easily read this passage as advocating just the perspective on description Dummett rejected in his 
preface. Dummett might counter this by arguing that his position allows criticism, while Wittgenstein‘s does 
not. But see the end of section III of this paper. 
 
5 Pears (1988), chapter 9. 
6 The following area few papers that discuss the idea that Wittgenstein advocated describing the uses of 
individual terms: Anscombe (1981); Butchvarov (1960); Hacker (1993), chapter 5; Hunter (1971). 
7 Hacker (1972), p. 117. 
8 Note that Wittgenstein is not identifying meaning with use, as evidenced by the phrase ―though not for all‖. In 
everyday language persons rarely talk about meaning in anything like the way philosophers do. The term 
―meaning‖ is most likely to come up when someone wants to know the meaning of a term. In this context, 
another way of putting what it is that that person wants to know is to say that he wants to know how the term is 
used. As far as I can see there is no reason to believe that Wittgenstein‘s remark means anything more 
mysterious than this. 
9 Wittgenstein (1980a), §964. 
10 Wittgenstein (1980b), §385. 
11 Wittgenstein (1967), §204. 
12 Of course, if philosophers are to compare descriptions, we must have descriptions to compare, and we may 
create those descriptions. But it is not our job as philosophers to create those descriptions, any more than it is 
the job of one who studies blood to make that blood, even though he may get some of the blood he studies from 
his own veins. 
13 There may be exceptions to this. For instance, I am told that the pain experienced when having bone marrow 
removed is an unlocated pain. 
14 For more on this aspect of Wittgenstein‘s thoughts about pain see discussions of his notion of criteria. 
Donagan (1966); Gert, B. (1989); Gert, H., (1995); Hintikkas (1986). 
15 Perhaps the most recent attempt to argue for this is Langsam (1995). 
16 Wittgenstein (1992). 
17 Even in the actual world we believe that we can gain accurate knowledge of one another‘s pains without 
being told about them. We generally gain this knowledge by seeing what has happened to the other person. But, 
unlike the case we are imagining, we unquestioningly accept that the wounded person is reliable in regards to 
his own pain in a way that no one else is. 
18 Langsam (1995),p. 307. 
19 For instance, see Wittgenstein (1958), §7, ―I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions 
into which it is woven, the ‗language-game‘.‖ See also, § 16, §41, §44, §96, §249, §300, and others. 
20 Kripke (1982), p. 7. 
21 This point has also been made by Collins (1992), p. 75. 
22 Kripke (1982), pp. 70±71. 
23 See Wittgenstein (1958), p. 33, bottom of the page. 
24 My thanks to an anonymous referee for emphasizing the point that it is the above sorts of facts about 
descriptions of rule following — that they must take into account context and practice — that grounds 
Wittgenstein‘s argument against the possibility of private language. 
25 See Wittgenstein (1958), p. 59, bottom of the page. 
26 See Wittgenstein (1958), §214, §226. 
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